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This Note considers the conflict of laws issues involved in ar-
bitration agreements contained in commercial contracts between
developed and developing countries. Discussion focuses on ar-
bitration clauses in contracts between private persons (i.e., in-
dividuals, partnerships, and corporations) and those between
private parties and public entities.' The arbitration clause (clause
compromissaire) is an agreement to submit disputes arising from
the transaction to arbitration. Although international organiza-
tions such as the International Chamber of Commerce (I.C.C.) in
Paris, the American Arbitration Association, and the Inter-
American Commercial Arbitration Commission employ arbitration
clauses, they fail to specify a choice of law for anything except
procedural questions. Parties may draft their own arbitration
clause, which can include specifications as to choice of law, place of
arbitration, or choice of arbitrators. The parties may also specify
whether reasons for the arbitration decision must be provided,
the permissibility of challenge, as well as the right to amend or
terminate the agreement. The question of applicable law arises
when it must be decided which law governs the validity of the ar-
bitration, which law determines the proceeding, and which law
should be applied to the merits of the controversy.
When arbitration works smoothly, recourse to the courts is not
necessary. However, even when court supervision is not required,
conflict of laws problems abound in arbitration between develop-
ing and developed countries. Cooperation in the settlement of in-
vestment disputes between the developed and developing coun-
tries is minimal at best. The basic problem is that the two groups
represent economic and political interests that are moving in op-
posite directions. If the faltering North-South dialogue is to con-
tinue, a more determined effort must be undertaken to achieve
mutual rules to resolve conflicts problems. This Note first deals
with the general policy and law of the developed and developing
' A public entity may range from an autonomous public corporation to one or more of the
branches of government. Economic agreements between a private party and the public enti-
ty include short-term supply contracts, regimes set up by concession agreements, and licen-
sing agreements.
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countries regarding arbitration of commercial disputes. Next is a
discussion of three instances where the question of applicable law
arises. Finally, this Note argues that although arbitration is a
useful institution and should be encouraged as a matter of na-
tional legal policy, it might be more realistic to develop interna-
tional standards and binding rules for the transfer of technology.
The' purpose of this Note is not merely to examine the conflicts
aspects of arbitration in the context of the North-South dialogue,
but also to determine the extent to which conflicts rules may be
applied to achieve the particular benefits of this method of dispute
settlement.
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Parties from developed countries generally are strong pro-
ponents of arbitration clauses in commercial contracts that they
enter into with parties from developing nations. This is due large-
ly to the view held by most foreign investors of arbitration as a
relatively neutral process. The privacy of arbitration proceedings
and a lessened risk of disclosure of confidential technology com-
bined with the fact that sophisticated international arbitration
techniques already exist are attractive to foreign investors. In ad-
dition, arbitration offers special advantages in the settlement of
disputes involving governments. For example, the private party
may be spared the effect of prejudice in the local courts when
governmental interests are involved, and the government fre-
quently will prefer the privacy of arbitration to preserve its
prestige.
There is an underlying attitude of distrust on the part of
developed countries regarding the settlement of disputes in the
courts of the developing states. The laws of developing countries
are considered to be radically different from Western concepts of
procedural and substantive due process. Local judges are believed
to be prejudiced against foreign economic interests and ignorant
of the technical, specialized knowledge held by an arbitrator hav-
ing expertise with the subject matter in dispute. Investors fear
the frequent exercise of executive and legislative fiat, which the
local courts, even if they so desired, are powerless to affect.
Moreover, investors cannot ignore the fact that host state courts
often are unwilling to pay compensation for expropriation of
foreign assets.
Arbitration offers some freedom from the concern that foreign
courts will not protect a party's rights. The United States
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Supreme Court has stated that uncertainty regarding applicable
law
will almost inevitably exist with respect to any contract
touching two or more countries, each with its own substantive
laws and conflict of law rules. A contractual provision specifying
in advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the
law to be applied is, therefore, an almost indispensable precondi-
tion to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essen-
tial to any international business transaction. Furthermore, such
a provision alleviates the danger that a dispute under the agree-
ment might be submitted to a forum hostile to the interests of
one of the parties or unfamiliar with the problem area involved.2
In developed countries, it is well settled that parties to an interna-
tional commercial contract may resolve disputes by arbitration.
The United States and most Western European nations are
among the forty-two signatories to the United Nations Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.3
Arbitration agreements are accorded transnational validity in ar-
ticle 11 of the Convention. Each state is bound to "recognize" writ-
ten agreements to submit disputes to arbitration on a "defined
legal relationship ... regarding a subject matter capable of settle-
ment by arbitration."' The United States also has signed and
ratified a number of bilateral and multilateral treaties recognizing
arbitration as the vehicle of dispute settlement.5 All of the major
trading countries, including the United States, have arbitration
statutes that require recognition of the validity and nonvalidity of
arbitration agreements.' In addition, all recent treatise of Friend-
ship, Commerce, and Navigation,7 except for two instances,8 pro-
2 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 416 U.S. 506, 516 (1974).
' Done at New York, June 10, 1958, 3 U.S.T. 2117, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38
[hereinafter cited as U.N. Convention]. The Convention entered into force for the United
States on December 29, 1970, subject to declarations, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 751
U.N.T.S. 58. The enabling legislation is found in chapter 2 of the United States Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1976). For a discussion of the U.N. Convention, see Mirabito, The
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards: The First Four Years, 5 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 471 (1976).
SId. art. 11 (1).
12 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 1044-46 (1971).
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1976); The Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, C. 27 S. 1 at
422; N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & Rules § 7502 (McKinny 1949).
FCN treaties are the instruments for the regulation of United States commercial rela-
tions with foreign nations. The structure of these treaties has been altered to reflect the
modern emphasis on investment problems.
' The exceptions are the treaties with Ethiopia and Muscat and Oman. A. FATOUROS.
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vide that arbitration agreements will be enforced, even if the ar-
bitration is to take place in a foreign country or if one of the ar-
bitrators is not a United States citizen.
The problems of private international law associated with
foreign investments are of major concern in developing countries.
Generally, the conflict of laws rules in most developing countries
have been imported from the United States and the former col-
onizing powers -Great Britain, France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal.
The developing nations are in a peculiarly unsatisfactory position.
On one hand, they realize the vital importance of foreign invest-
ment in their countries, while on the other hand they are trying to
protect their own independence and economic growth. One author
accurately described the situation: "At present most of the less
developed countries are in a state of reaction against nineteenth
century imperialism. They have acquired a distaste for foreign
capital and foreign administration and they are more anxious to
protect themselves from further exploitation than to take advan-
tage of current opportunities."9 The developing countries consider
themselves relatively powerless against foreign investors and
multinational enterprises in negotiations and in the enforcement
of their national regulations. In fact, it is often difficult for a
developing country to obtain any information about the conduct of
a multinational when the company's headquarters and offices are
in a developed part of the world. General agreement exists among
the developing countries that foreign investment is to be permit-
ted only under careful control and after close scrutiny.
The developing countries are reluctant to submit to any binding
international arbitrations when problems arise out of their
economic dealings with the developed states. State guarantees to
foreign investors rarely include any provisions on arbitration as a
means of settling disputes.'0 One commentator described the situa-
tion as follows:
The unwillingness is to be attributed to a refusal to acquiesce a
priori and without limitations, to the existing rules of interna-
tional law, especially those pertaining to economic matters. The
governments of underdeveloped countries seem to fear that ar-
bitration or other international tribunals will tend to ignore the
GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS 184 n.305 (1962). Compare, for example,
the treaty with Iran, article III (3), cited id n.306.
A. LEWIS, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 412 (1955).
10 A. FATOUROS, supra note 8, at 353.
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substantive problems involved and to apply rigid legal prin-
ciples, evolved in the nineteenth century under different inter-
national conditions ......
A. A. Fatauros points out that arbitration would probably be
more acceptable to the developing countries if the subject con-
cerns some highly technical matter that has nothing to do with
public policy. The developing states are also more favorably
disposed to an arbitration proceeding in which the arbitrator is
allowed to reach a decision ex aequo et bono and not in accordance
with strict law.1"
The Latin American countries are representative of this at-
titude that foreign investment must be controlled carefully. There
has been a noticeable move toward tightly-controlled economies,
with development plans designed to increase national growth as
quickly and extensively as possible."3 The developing states
believe they can create industrialized societies - given sufficient
foreign aid - regulated by their own national laws. Foreign in-
vestors seeking to do business in Latin America are apprehensive
about the security of their investments. The spectre of expropria-
tion and nationalization of investments may destroy any con-
fidence investors have in the agreement. 4
Most Latin American states recognize arbitration agreements
in international commercial contract disputes between private
parties. 5 The laws of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica do
not specifically mention international arbitration, but arbitration
agreements have been upheld. 6 Nicaragua, Paraguay, Colombia,
" Id at 354.
" An example of an ex aequo et bono arbitration procedure is the agreement between
the Greek state and the Polish FUM CEOP, dealing with the establishment of a sugar pro-
cessing plant, March 3, 1960, article 34, 1960. Ephimeristis Kyrerniseas Fase. 1, No. 44, 407.
The agreement stated that "[tihe arbitrators judging ex aequo et bono are neither bound by
any special law nor by any rules of procedure in carrying out the arbitration."
" An example of this effort to establish a secure economic order is the Andean Pact's
Code on Foreign Investment. Enacted in 1971, its essential goal is to promote a healthy
economic future for the host state by providing for gradual nationalization of foreign invest-
ment. The Code is reprinted at 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 126 (1972). See Zamora, Andean
Common Market-Regulations of Foreign Investments: Blueprint for the Future? 10 INT'L
LAW. 153 (1976).
" Examples of the expropriation and nationalization of foreign investments occurred in
Chile and Venezuela. See Anaconda Company and Chile Copper Company-Overseas
Private Investment Corporation Arbitration of Disputes Involving U.S. Investment
Guaranty Program, 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1210 (1975).
"5 The term "international commercial contracts" refers to contracts between a Latin
American party and a foreign party located in a Latin American state.
,' See T. RIVERA Hijo, COMMERCIAL LAWS OF EL SALVADOR 21 (1972); 0. LORA, COMMER-
1981]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Brazil, and Bolivia use the law on arbitrability of domestic
disputes when dealing with international disputes." The 1940
Montevideo International Private Law Treaty" is the law used in
Argentina and Uruguay regarding international commercial ar-
bitration. 19
Despite acceptance of arbitration to settle disputes between
private parties, Latin American countries have refused to
acknowledge the validity of arbitration agreements in contracts
between a foreign private party and a state or state enterprise.
The developing countries view private-state arbitrations as at-
tempts by foreign investors to bring undue pressure on the state
and as infringements on national sovereignty.
The Latin American experience with arbitration has been
frustrating. Lionel Summers, an expert on commercial activity in
the region, points out that although these nations have par-
ticipated in a substantial number of arbitrations in the past, few of
the decisions were in their favor. 0 Parties from the developing
countries frequently were coerced into arbitration and the ar-
'bitrators were rarely from Latin American states.2' The belief
arose that the arbitrators, far from being a neutral force, were
biased and the outcome was predetermined in favor of the
developed state.
Latin American countries have consistently refused to ratify
the various international arbitration conventions. Brazil is the on-
ly country in the region to ratify the 1923 Geneva Protocol on Ar-
bitration Clauses,22 and no Latin nation has signed the 1965 World
CIAL LAWS OF GUATEMALA 9 (Supp. 1971); J. PICADO, COMMERCIAL LAWS OF COSTA RICA 42
(1972).
"7 See R. AGUIRRE. COMMERCIAL LAWS OF BOLIVIA 12, 14 (1972); E. VALENCA. COMMERCIAL
LAWS OF BRAZIL 23 (1972); A. ZURITA, COMMERCIAL LAWS OF ECUADOR 14 (1972).
" Treaty on International Procedural Law, signed at Montevideo, 19 March 1940, 9 Pan-
Am T.S. reprinted in 2 REGISTER OF TEXTS OF CONVENTIONS AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS CON-
CERNING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 21 (1973). The treaty was ratified by Argentina,
Paraguay, and Uruguay.
9 See M. BATRES, COMMERCIAL LAWS OF HONDURAS 27 (1972); R. DURLING, COMMERCIAL
LAWS OF PANAMA 18 (1972); F. MARTINEZ, MONTES DE OCA, COMMERCIAL LAWS OF MEXICO 22
(1972); G. CLARKE ROMERO, COMMERCIAL LAWS OF PERU 16 (1972); A. SIPERMAN & E.
WEINSCHILBAUM, COMMERCIAL LAWS OF NICARAGUA 17 (1972). Private international arbitra-
tions occur in Argentine under the Argentina Chamber of Commerce, the Argentine In-
stitute of Commercial Law, and the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange.
2 Summers, Arbitration and Latin America, 3 CALIF. W. INT'L L. J. 1 (1972).
" Id. at 10.
' Protocol on arbitration clauses, signed at Geneva, September 24, 1923, 27. N.T.S. 158,




Bank Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes bet-
ween States and Nationals of Other States,23 which provides for
the resolution of disputes arising between states and foreign in-
vestors doing business within those states. The Convention
established the International Center for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) at the World Bank Headquarters in Washington,
to which parties may voluntarily submit for binding arbitration.'
Nor has any Latin American state supported the 1967 Draft Inter-
American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, '5
which endorses compulsory arbitration clauses." None of these
countries has recognized the 1975 Inter-American Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration, " a hybrid of the ICSID
Convention and the U.N. Convention, which is much advanced in
terms of meeting the objections previously raised by developing
states.
Latin America steadfastly maintains the position that disputes
involving a Latin American state must be resolved by local law.
The Calvo Doctrine embodies this idea.28 It holds that foreign per-
sons are given only those rights enjoyed by nationals and
therefore may settle their disputes only before local authorities
under local law. Most investment contracts between states and
foreign nationals contain a Calvo Clause' in which the foreign par-
" Convention on the Settlement of Disputes between States and Nationals of other
States, done at Washington, March 18, 1965, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 1597, Register
at 46 [hereinafter cited as ICSID Convention].
24 The jurisdiction covers any dispute arising from an investment agreement between a
contracting state and a citizen of another contracting state, in which both parties agree to
submit to arbitration. Id art. 25. See Broches, Arbitration in Investment Disputes in IN-
TERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 292 (Schmitthoff ed. 1975).
25 Reprinted in INTER-AMERICAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Annex C 21 (1968).
26 Id. at 18. Local arbitration law was to govern in the absence of an express agreement
between the parties.
" The 1975 Convention reiterates the provisions of the 1967 Convention concerning the
validity of the arbitration clause. The 1975 Convention includes parts of the New York Con-
vention regarding the refusal of states to recognize awards (art. 5 (1) and art. 5 (2)), and an
article allowing any state to accede to the Convention (art. 9). The explicit public policy ex-
ception included in the 1975 draft (which was not included in earlier drafts) would seem to
meet the major objections of the Latin American states to other drafts.
28 The doctrine was adopted in the nineteenth century to stop military interventions by
the United States and Europe on the pretext of diplomatic protection of their citizens. See
D. SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE 9, 15 (1955).
" The inclusion of the clause in all contracts entered into between foreign nationals and
state enterprises is required by law in Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and
Venezuela. See, e.g., CONST. art. 27 (Mexico, 1917). The clause is in common usage in Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Paraguay. The clause is used rarely
in Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay, and Honduras, and not at all in Argentina, the Dominican
Republic, and Haiti. D. SHEA, supra note 28, at 279.
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ty agrees, when submitting to local law, not to use diplomatic in-
tervention by its own government to attempt to resolve the
dispute. One writer who studied the impact of the Calvo doctrine
upon various methods of dispute settlement ° concluded that
despite the growing internal harmony among Latin American
states "the confidence of foreign investors .. .does not in most
cases presently extend to the prospect of either the host country
courts or ad hoc or institutional arbitration in Latin America. 31
One of the reasons for the Latin American refusal to ratify in-
ternational commercial arbitration agreements is a distrust of in-
stitutional arbitration organizations, such as ICSID, based on
their view that these organizations are biased. A specific objec-
tion to the ICSID convention is aimed at article 42(1), which pro-
vides that international law will be used in the arbitration if any
part of the law chosen by the parties violates international stan-
dards.32 This provision is at odds with the Calvo Doctrine, which
holds that a state will not be subject to foreign law or interna-
tional law formulated along lines alien to its own economic and
philosophic concepts. This choice of law rule explains the failure of
any Latin American state to ratify the ICSID convention.
It is understandable that Latin America finds ratification of the
majority of arbitration conventions unpalatable, but the Calvo
Doctrine objections do not apply to purely private arbitration
where a state's sovereignty is not threatened. Although Latin
America may be precluded from ratifying the ICSID convention
as long as the region adheres to the Calvo Doctrine, both the U.N.
Convention and the 1975 Convention apply to purely private
disputes and provide for review of foreign arbitrations that is as
complete as that under local codes. Apparently, Latin American
countries are concerned that their standards of review will be sub-
ject to international scrutiny. International commercial arbitra-
tion is not completely alien to Latin America, but there has not
been much judicial interpretation of national code provisions con-
Article 51 of the Andean Foreign Investment Code assumes that the clause is read into
all contracts between Andean Pact nations and foreign investors, and prohibits any con-
tracts which 1) removes disputes from the jurisdiction of these states, or 2) allows foreign
countries to be subrogated to the rights of their nationals. See 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 126
(1972).
' Radway, Settlement of Investment Disputes in the Inter-American System, (unpub-
lished paper) (1973), cited in Note, The Future of Arbitration in Latin America: A Study of
its Regional Development, 8 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 480, 481 (1976).
' Id o
'~ See Broches, supra note 24, at 1, 2, 292, 296-97.
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cerning review of foreign awards. If these countries do ratify the
conventions, their standards of review would not be interfered
with directly, but would be measured by international standards.
Latin American leaders should recognize that as their interna-
tional influence increases and their arbitration law develops, their
standards will be more in line with international standards.
Moreover, if Latin American involvement with international trade
continues to grow as expected, it would be to their benefit to
become parties to these private arbitration agreements. The
ratification of these conventions would improve the confidence of
foreign investors and enhance the role of Latin America in the in-
ternational economic order.
III. VALIDITY OF THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE
The validity of the arbitration agreement is the first issue ad-
dressed when a dispute arises over a commercial contract be-
tween parties from developed and developing countries. General-
ly, the validity of the arbitration agreement is determined by the
characterization given it by the forum in which the clause is
sought to be enforced. Therefore, it is essential to determine the
validity and enforceability of the arbitration clauses within dif-
ferent legal systems.
Determination of the validity of the arbitration clause in terms
of the applicable statutory law can be decided only by the courts.3
Prior to the arbitration proceeding, one of the parties may peti-
tion a court to enforce the agreement to arbitrate. Before or dur-
ing the arbitraton, if one of the parties brings suit and refuses to
arbitrate, the court may stay its proceedings pending arbitration.
The court generally will decide the issue of the validity and effect
of the arbitration clause according to the law governing the con-
tract as a whole. Therefore, the validity issue is partially depend-
ent on the local law of the contract. Resort also could be made to
the lex fori (law of the forum), although there may be no signifi-
cant contacts with this law. The law of the seat of arbitration may
be employed if the seat has been determined by this stage of the
suit. The United Nations Convention states that arbitration can-
not proceed if the arbitration agreement is "null and void," in-
operative or incapable of being performed. However, the Conven-
tion makes no statement regarding the choice of law that will
" Moseley v. Electronic & Missile Facilities, 374 U.S. 167 (1963).
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determine whether the agreement is "null and void."34 The point is
that the choice of law is not something that the parties necessarily
know before the action commences. Ultimately, it is the court that'
decides the law to be applied to the parties' arbitration agree-
ment.
Most legal systems in the developed countries exclude certain
types of commercial disputes from arbitration and an arbitration
clause in a contract dealing with excluded matters will be invalid.
In France, disputes over goodwill, patent and trademark,
bankruptcy, cartel agreements involving foreign trade, and the
validity of corporations may not be arbitrated.35 German law is
similar to the French except that cartel agreements involving
foreign trade may be arbitrated after approval is received from
the cartel office." Under English law, almost any case that con-
cerns money damages may be arbitrated.37
In the United States, several areas of commercial transactions
are covered by regulatory legislation such as patent and
trademark statutes, antitrust laws, and securities. The United
States courts, however, have been fairly consistent in upholding
arbitration agreements when there is a clash between foreign and
domestic legislation regarding what subjects may be arbitrated.
An example of such a conflict was present in Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Company.' In this case, the Supreme Court ruled on the
enforcement of a contract between a German firm and a United
States firm. The contract directed that all disputes be settled in
English courts. The Bremen case did not involve an arbitration
agreement but a choice of forum clause, which is closely related
and involves the relevant choice of law analysis. The English
courts would have enforced an exculpatory clause that United
States courts would have declared invalid on public policy
grounds. The Supreme Court decided that the choice of forum
clause should be upheld.' The Court stated that a refusal to
uphold the choice of forum clause would be a "parochial concept
that disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts
.... We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and in-
ternational waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our
U.N. Convention, supra note 3, art. 11 (3).
M. DOMKE. THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ch. 13 (1968).
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 235 (Sanders ed. 1956-65).
17 RUSSELL ON THE LAW OF ARBITRATION 20-24 (18th ed., A. Walton ed. 1970).




laws, and resolved in our courts."4 The Bremen case is evidence
that Untied States courts are beginning to recognize the idea that
flexibility in international commercial transactions is essential to
the proper functioning of economic trade between countries of
divergent economic and political philosophies. The Court in
Bremen acknowledged that a transaction that has relevant con-
tacts with more than one jurisdiction may be governed by a law
other than that of the forum. If the choice of the parties is
reasonable, this law will be applied despite any compelling public
policy provisions of the forum." The Bremen case reinforced the
importance of arbitration for international contractual disputes.
Another important United States case relevant to the validity
issue is Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co." Alberto-Culver, a United
States multinational firm, undertook to purchase from Scherk, a
German cosmetic company, the trademarks and the stock of two
corporations owned by Scherk. The contract was negotiated in
Germany, the United States, and England, signed in Austria, and
the deal was closed in Switzerland. There was an I.C.C. arbitra-
tion clause included in the contract. When Alberto-Culver
discovered that there was a shortage in Scherk's inventory, it ig-
nored the arbitration agreement and filed suit in federal district
court in Chicago. The issue in the case was whether the agree-
ment to arbitrate disputes in a contract to purchase securities was
enforceable. The court upheld the arbitration clause and stated
that "the subject matter of the contract concerned the sale of
business enterprises organized under the laws of and primarily
situated in European countries, and whose activities were largely,
if not entirely, directed to European markets.""3 The court stated
that an arbitration clause "is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum
selection clause that posits not only the situs of the suit, but also
the procedure to be used in resolving the disputes."" The court
recognized that it is a matter of the public policy laws of different
states and nations and that there are territorial limitations on the
40 Id. at 9.
" In a recent New York District Court case, the court upheld a choice of forum clause
stating that the respondent company had contracted to submit to arbitration in New York
and under the modern view choice of forum clauses are given effect unless they are unfair
or unreasonable. Detker v. Victoria Steamship Corp., No. 79-6059 (S.D.N.Y.) (1980).
42 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
3 In Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), the Supreme Court held that an arbitration
agreement in a contract to purchase securities was void. The Wilko case was entirely
domestic and involved no foreign contacts.
" Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515 (1974).
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application of these laws. If there are enough significant contacts
with the forum, it may allow for the use of its own public laws. A
court in a developed country may decide that the location of the
challenging parties in the forum constitutes a significant contact
and employ its own public policy rather than that of one of the
developing states. The Court in Scherk left unanswered a number
of issues including any clear indication to determine in which
forum the alleged infraction must be resolved.
Questions of validity frequently arise in contracts between par-
ties from developed and developing countries as a result of the
adhesive nature of the arbitration agreement. In the typical
transfer of technology agreement, the supplier of the technology
has a superior bargaining position and often uses this position to
compel the resolution of disputes by arbitration. The Supreme
Court of the United States has spoken against the coercive
methods of economically powerful parties who use standardized
clauses in commercial agreements.45 These standardized forms
often are buried in the body of the contract or appended as an
afterthought. The economically weaker party often is unaware of
the implications of apparently innocuous clauses. Even if the
weaker party is alert to the effect of the clauses, it is powerless to
challenge them because of the need for the developed countries'
technology. These standardized clauses may deny the party from
the developing state recourse to its own courts, and leave no
choice as to the location, applicable law, or composition of the ar-
bitration procedure." The "formidable array of restrictive clauses
that can be (and usually are) included in transfer of technology
agreements"47 includes clauses that remove4 conflicts over inter-
4 Id at 519.
" Moseley v. Electronic & Missile Facilities, 374 U.S. 167 (1963).
47 Wilson, Freedom of Contract and Adhesion Contracts, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 172, 188
(1965). See also Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REV.
1072 (1953). For more recent discussion, see Egea, Multinational Corporations in the Opera-
tion and Ideology of International Transfer of Technology, 10 STUD. COMP. INT'L DEv. 11, 13,
16 n.20 (1975).
" Nussbaum, The Separability Doctrine in American and Foreign Arbitration, 17
N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 609 (1940). The I.C.C. states in article 13 (4) that challenges to the ar-
bitrator's jurisdiction must wait until after the award is made. The U.N. Convention, supra
note 3, allows the courts to retain jurisdiction if the arbitration clause is void and the ar-
bitrator had no jurisdiction over the dispute. Under United States law, a charge of fraud
must be directed at the arbitration clause itself to take the issue out of the arbitrator's com-
petence. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-04 (1967).
Under English law, claims of fraud are to be decided by the courts. The Arbitration Act,
1950, supra note 6, 24 (2) (3). However, this does not apply to arbitration arising under the
United Nations or Geneva Conventions.
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pretation and breach of contractual obligations to Western courts
or arbitration tribunals.
The determination of the validity of the arbitration agreement
raises the question of severability: whether the power of the ar-
bitrator extends to the determination of the validity of the main
contract. The arbitrator's power is generally an issue to be decid-
ed by the courts. This issue, in fact, concerns the proper extent of
the jurisdiction of the courts and arbitrators, and therefore will be
governed by the law of the proceedings. The issue usually arises
when one of the parties charges that the main contract is illegal
because of fraud, duress, etc. If the arbitration agreement is
characterized as an inseparable part of the main contract, then it
will not be enforced as part of an illegal contract. In the United
Kingdom, and until recently in France and the United States,
courts considered the arbitration clause as part of the main con-
tract.49 However, in Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta,50 a United States
court allowed the arbitration of a dispute in a contract challenged
for lack of mutuality. Courts that do recognize the separability
doctrine consider the arbitration clause to be separate from the
primary contract. Thus, the arbitrator can determine whether the
main contract is unenforceable due to a host of factors and still
uphold the arbitration agreement. The United States,51 Germany,52
Belgium,' Poland,' Czechoslovakia,55 and France56 are among the
countries that recognize the severability doctrine.
The validity issue makes it apparent that, in practical terms, it
is often impossible to avoid litigation to settle an investment
dispute. In a case where the court determines that the arbitration
agreement is not valid, the dispute never will be arbitrated at all.
IV. LAW GOVERNING THE PROCEEDINGS
The system of law under which the arbitration is held is known
49 Wilner, Determining the Law Governing Performance in International Commercial
Arbitration: A Comparative Study, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 645, 653 n.16 (1965).
" Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y. 2d 329, 174 N.E. 2d 463, 214 N.Y.S. 2d 353 (1961).
", Prima Paint Co. v. Flood & Conkin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
5 G. DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS-APPLICABLE LAW AND SETTLEMENT OF
DISPUTES: A STUDY IN CONFLICT AVOIDANCE 813.06, at 36 (1975).
5 Id.
54 W. DEBEVAISE, THE ARBITRABILITY OF GAPS IN LONG-TERM SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL
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in conflict terms as the "law of the proceedings,"57 or "loi d' ar-
bitrage."' It is the law of the proceedings59 that determines what
conflict of laws rule should be applied to the substance of the
obligation."0 The law of the proceedings determines a number of
other important questions such as whether the arbitrator must
give reasons for the award, whether the award must be based on
substantive rules of law, and the extent to which the arbitrator's
decision is subject to review by a court of law. Some jurisdictions
have ruled that the law of the proceedings includes all issues ex-
cept questions of formalities, capacity, and arbitrality.6 Other
jurisdictions include the nationality of the award, the conflict
rules that determine the decision regarding the substance of the
dispute (including the law governing the validity of the arbitral
agreement), and the arbitrator's license to apply rules of law or
equity.2
One of the preliminary decisions made by the arbitrator is the
extent to which the law of the proceedings may be chosen by the
" Smedresman, Conflict of Laws in International Commercial Arbitration: A Survey of
Recent Developments, 7 CALIF. W. INT'L L. J. 263 (1977).
' A distinction should be noted between the law of the proceedings, which is dealt with
herein, and the rules of procedure, which are the rules that will be applied to the arbitra-
tion proceeding and which are a combination of rules to regulate the arbitration (some of
these rules are designed by the parties and others are determined by the governing body of
law).
"' It is this system of law governing the arbitration that determines the rules from which
derogation is not permitted. This would be the legal system of the state in which the ar-
bitration award is deemed to be domestic for purposes of getting a confirmation of the
award. Therefore, the law of the proceedings is not always the same as the seat of the ar-
bitration.
W Mezger, The Arbitrator and Private International Law, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AR-
BITRATION 239 (M. Domke ed. 1958). Professor Goldman, one of the leading experts in the
conflicts area, disagreed with this position in his 1963 Lectures at the Hague Academy of
International Law, entitled Conflicts of Laws in the Field of International Arbitration in
Private Law. Examples of disputes involving the "substance of the obligation" include the
following:
Whether a carrier is liable for the loss of or injury to the goods or for delay in
their delivery.
Whether an agent has exceeded his authority.
Whether currency restrictions prevent the payment of the amount due under the
contract.
Whether a stipulation exempting the promisor from liability in certain events is
effective.
Whether an agreement in restraint of trade is enforceable.
Cheshire, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 248, 249 (6th ed. 1961). Cited in Wilner, supra note
49, at 648.
" Lalive, Problems Relatives in lArbitrage International Commercial, 120 RECUEIL DES
COURS (Hague Academy of International Law) 573, 611 (1-1967).
2 Mezger, supra note 60, at 233.
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parties. It is the arbitrator who decides whether the parties may
choose the system of law used in the arbitration. The arbitrator's
decision must comply with the public policy of the legal system
that will enforce the award.
The legal characterization of arbitration will determine to a
large extent whether the parties will be free to choose the law of
the proceedings. There are generally three views of the nature of
arbitration. The first view considers arbitration agreements to be
private contracts and therefore free from any system of law. In
this case, the parties are free to choose the applicable law. At the
other extreme is the view that arbitration essentially is a judicial
process and subject to the rules of the place of arbitration. The
third theory, and perhaps the most accepted, holds that arbitra-
tion is a hybrid of the two extreme views and only certain
elements of the agreement are deemed independent and deter-
minable by the parties." Most jurisdictions recognize that all con-
tracts, and therefore arbitration agreements, are tied to a par-
ticular legal system.64 What needs to be addressed at this point is
the position of the more prominent states and arbitration
organizations toward the power of the parties to choose the law of
the proceedings.65
An English court ruled in James Miller and Partners, Ltd. v.
:3 Wilner, supra note 49, at 651.
', Id. Wilner cites as an example of this position the Etat Francais v. Comite'de la Bourse
d'Amsterdam et Mauren, Cour de Cassation, 21 June 1950, 39 REV. CRIT. DR. INT. PR. 609
(1950). There the court stated: "Every international contract is of necessity bound to the
law of a state." Id. at 609.
65 The majority of foreign investment laws does not contain many provisions regarding
the settlement of disputes and the applicable law. The Greek investment code is an excep-
tion as it provides for the settlement of disputes by arbitration between the government
and foreign investors over the interpretation and application of instruments of approval
issued by virtue of this law. One arbitrator (sometimes two) is to be appointed by each of
the parties within a certain period of time. A third (or fifth) arbitrator, who may be a
foreign national, is then elected by those already appointed. The arbitrators' decision is
final and without appeal, binding upon both the Greek government and the foreign in-
vestor. Cited in A. FATOUROS, supra note 8, at 186-87.
Other exceptions are worthy of mention. In India, under the petroleum concession rules,
disputes between the government and the licensee regarding the license, royalties, alleged
breaches, or the amount of compensation to be paid by the government upon acquisition of
the concession, can be submitted to arbitration. The Pakistan legislation is similar as it
makes provisions for arbitration of questions over the cancellation or renewal of petroleum
leases and the amounts to be paid the government in the event of purchase of the plant
after termination of the lease. The government and the licensee appoint one arbitrator
each, if the two arbitrators disagree, an umpire is appointed. Similar laws are also found in
Libya. Morocco, Iran, and Mali. See A. FATOUROS, supra note 9, at 186-87.
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Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd." that the law of pro-
ceedings is independent and the parties are free to choose the
system they desire. The case involved a Scottish firm that con-
tracted to carry out construction at an English firm's plant in
Scotland. The contract was concluded in Scotland on an English
standard form contract, and included an arbitration clause. When
a dispute arose, a Scottish arbitrator was appointed. The arbitra-
tion took place in Scotland and employed Scottish procedures to
which the English firm objected. The House of Lords held that the
law governing the proceedings, in this case Scottish, could be dif-
ferent from the law governing the substance of the case, which
was English law. No case has been reported in which the parties
either chose as the law of the proceedings a system of law other
than the proper law of the contract, or completely failed to exer-
cise their power to choose the law governing the arbitration.
However, the court in James Miller emphasized that effect would
be given to the choice of law made by the parties.
It cannot be doubted that the courts would give effect to the
choice of law other than the proper law of the contract. Thus, if
the parties agreed on an arbitration in Switzerland, it may be
held that whereas English law governs the validity, interpreta-
tion and effect of the arbitration clause as such (including the
scope of the arbitrator's jurisdiction) the proceedings are
governed by Swiss law. It is also submitted that where the par-
ties have failed to choose the law governing the arbitration pro-
ceedings, these proceedings must be considered, at any rate,
prima facie as being governed by the law of the country in
which the arbitration is held, on the gound that it is the country
most closely connected with the proceedings."
(1970) A.C. 583, rev'g (1969) 1 W.L.R. 337.
'7 (1970) A.C. 583, 616, per Lord Wilberforce, citing A. DICEY & J. MORRIS. THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 1047-48 (8th ed. 1967). See also Smedresman, supra note 57, at 269-70, who notes
that the ninth edition of Dicey & Morris has revised this passage to emphasize the parties
freedom of choice. Preceding the sentence which starts off "[it] cannot be doubted . . " it
now states:
It is, however, for the parties not only to choose the law which is to govern their
agreement to arbitrate, but also the law which is to govern the arbitration pro-
ceeding. Normally the parties exercise this power by determining (expressly or
by implication) the country in which the arbitration is to take place, ie., normally
the proper law of the contract, which includes the agreement to arbitrate, coin-
cides with the choice of the law governing the arbitration proceedings.
Also changed was the phrase "the proceedings are governed by Swiss law," to "but the ar-
bitration proceedings (including the extent to which they are subject to judicial control) will
be governed by Swiss law." The final sentence now reads: "those proceedings will almost
certainly be governed by the law of the country in which the arbitration is held .. "
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James Miller held that the law of the proceedings is independent
and may be different from the law applied to the merits of the
dispute.
There are a number of problems with the James Miller
analysis. The difficulties become evident when considering the
rules regarding the proceedings in the International Chamber of
Commerce arbitration convention. Under the I.C.C. rules, the law
of the proceedings is that chosen by the parties, "or failing such
choice, the rules of law of the country where the arbitrator holds
the proceedings." 8 One of the problems is that it is doubtful that a
law of the proceedings can be identified or "chosen" at an early
stage in the proceedings. Another question is that since a par-
ticular court may have jurisdiction to oversee an arbitration, even
after the proceeding has begun in another forum using a foreign
system of law, of what use is the notion of the law of the pro-
ceedings?
In order to deal with these questions, it must be recognized that
any time a transaction has a number of different foreign contacts
and the parties are from different countries, the use of several
forums to resolve the dispute is inevitable. The arbitration clause
will affect only particular issues. In order to ascertain the forum
in which each issue will be decided, the various national courts
should determine the full extent of their jurisdiction over the par-
ties and proceedings. This can be achieved if the courts give effect
to the parties choice of forum and their specification regarding the
arbitration process. Such action will help contain the litigation. In
fact, the Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.69 case dealt with this pro-
blem when it considered the effect of the I.C.C. arbitration clause.
The arbitration agreement selected Paris as the site of the ar-
bitration so that, under I.C.C. rules, French law was the law of the
proceedings chosen by the parties. When the United States firm
tried to enjoin the I.C.C. arbitration on the ground that the par-
ticular subject was not arbitrable under United States law, the
court refused and stated:
A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an in-
ternational arbitration agreement.., would invite unseemly and
mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure tactical
litigation advantages. In the present case, for example, it is not
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION art.
16 (1955), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 24.
" 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
19811 685
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
inconceivable that if Scherk had anticipated that Alberto-Culver
would be able in this country to enjoin resort in arbitration, he
might have sought an order in France or some other country en-
joining Alberto-Culver from proceeding with its litigation in the
United States. Whatever recognition the courts of this country
might ultimately have granted to the order of the foreign court,
the dicey atmosphere of such a legal no-man's-land would surely
damage the fabric of international commerce and trade, and im-
peril the willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into in-
ternational commercial agreements."
Parties to international commercial agreements should realize
that different countries may have jurisdiction at different stages
of the arbitration proceeding. The notion that only the law of the
seat may be the law of the proceedings is obsolete. In the typical
international arbitration, it may not be clear where the seat is
located. Often the panel may convene in one place, meet in
another, and issue the award somewhere else. The Scherk case
demonstrates how useless it is to designate a seat in the arbitra-
tion agreement. Indeed, the seat of the arbitration often is com-
pletely fortuitous. It may simply be the place where the pro-
ceeding is convened for the arbitrators to meet. In such a case, the
seat is unconnected with the parties or the transaction, except as
a place of convenience.
The right of the parties to chose the law of the proceedings is
gaining support in international legal organizations. The notion of
contractual freedom and the independence of procedural law is
provided for in the U.N. Convention. The Convention states that a
court may refuse to recognize and enforce an award when "the
composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure
was not in accordance with the law of the country where the ar-
bitration took place. .". ."' This section of the convention, when
read carefully, indicates that the procedural law may be different
from the law of the seat of the arbitration. The law of the seat or-
dinarily would be applied if there were no other selection by the
parties. The I.C.C., which was a moving force behind the U.N.
Convention, pushed for the adoption of a "supranational" award,
free from the various national, formal, and procedural re-
quirements." The 1975 I.C.C. rules free arbitrators from local pro-
cedural law. Article 11 reads:
70 Id. at 516-17.
" U.N. Convention, supra note 3, art. V (1)(d).
71 Carabiber, Conditions on Development of International Commercial Arbitration, in IN-
TERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION 149, 155-56 (M. Domke ed. 1958).
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The rules governing the proceedings before the arbitrator shall
be those resulting from these rules and, where these rules are
silent, only rules which the parties (or, failing them, the ar-
bitrator) may settle, and whether or not reference is thereby
made to a municipal procedural law to be applied to the arbitra-
tion."
A number of New York cases have appeared to uphold the spirit
of article 11 and the freedom of the parties."
Although there is growing acceptance of the freedom of parties
to choose the law of the proceedings, it is not a legal doctrine par-
ties can rely on when drawing up a contract. Considerable opposi-
tion exists in the developing countries to the total independence
of the law of the proceeding and to party autonomy. The idea of a
neutral procedure free from the supervision of national laws is
feared by the developing states. Their fears are reflected in the
logic of the Calvo Doctrine. The developing countries are convinc-
ed that party autonomy in the choice of the law of the proceedings
will give parties from the developed states another tool which
may be used in negotiations. However, opposition to party
freedom is found in local courts, especially in the developed states,
where there is a reluctance to give up jurisdiction. Furthermore,
many courts refuse to allow the parties to choose the law of the
proceedings. Procedural law is essentially mandatory, composed
of nonwaivable safeguards. This does not change simply because a
contract involves international aspects.75 The local courts rely on
this fact to avoid giving effect to party autonomy. The various na-
tional arbitration statutes specify exactly what the parties are
free to choose. Therefore, unless the local law permits party
autonomy, the law of the proceedings may be set by mandatory
rules of law and, accordingly, the parties will not be free to
choose.
Generally, it can be concluded that the move to give effect to
party autonomy is growing. This is a positive sign. The special re-
quirements of international arbitration require that courts begin
to recognize the power of parties to choose the law of the pro-
ceedings. It seems reasonable to allow party autonomy and
" INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF CONCILIATION AND ARIBTRATION art.
11 (1975), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 24, at 40.
(Schmitthoff ed. 1980).
, Mobil Oil Indonesia, Inc. v. Asa Vera Oil (Indonesia) Ltd., 56 App. Div. 2d 339, 341, 392
N.Y.S. 2d 614, 616 (1977).
71 Szaszy, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 14 Am. J. COMP. L.
658, 667-68 (1966).
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modification of local procedural rules if the rights of the parties
are preserved adequately. Of course, the protection of these
rights and the standards used in determining them are precisely
the issues with which the developing countries are most con-
cerned. Their fears are warranted because even though private in-
ternational law is more or less uniform, substantive contract law
often is radically different. Given the existing inequality in
bargaining strength, the developing states have an interest in
maintaining the lex fori notion and in retaining some control over
the law applied in the arbitration.
V. LAW APPLICABLE TO THE MERITS
There are a number of conflicts issues involved in determining
the rules of substantive law that the arbitrator applies to disputes
regarding the merits of the contract. The general rule is that the
arbitrator must follow the conflict rules of the law applicable to
the merits."8
Choice of law clauses in arbitration agreements are often part
of the "boilerplate" section of international contracts." They are
not effective in managing future disputes and are more or less
superfluous from the developing countries point of view.
However, such clauses are still considered effective bargaining
tools and as a means to reassure clients wary of arbitrations held
in unfamiliar forums. When an arbitration clause and a choice of
law agreement appear together in an international contract
amiable construction will not be allowed,7" and the system of law"
provided for should be applied to the merits of the dispute.'
Stipulations of foreign law are fairly common in I.C.C. arbitra-
tions, where the seat of the proceedings varies."1
"' Of course the arbitrator can avoid this if the law of the proceedings provides for a
means other than the use of substantive law as used in the courts. This would all depend on
the local laws' position regarding the freedom of the parties to choose the law of the pro-
ceedings in addition to the parties power in determining he substantive law.
" See Lowe, Choice of Law Clauses in International Contracts: A Practical Approach, 12
HARV. INT'L L. J., (1971).
71 Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
" Renvoi is usually not applied in contract cases, particularly when there is a choice of
law. DICEY & MORRIS, surpa note 69, at 723-23; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §
186 (1971).
'o The merits of the contract include such issues as performance, discharge through force
majeure, frustration or impossibility, liability for loss or damage of goods, and agency prob-
lems. G. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 236-37 (9th ed. 1974).
", The arbitration clause in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), provides an
example:
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The essential validity of choice of law clauses generally is not a
matter of dispute. However, most legal systems place theoretical
limits on the validity of these agreements: either the lex fori or
the proper law of the contract is controlling. Most of the legal
systems in developed states give due regard to the concept of par-
ty autonomy. Under English law, the intent of the parties deter-
mines the "proper law of the contract."' 2 In the United States, the
Uniform Commercial Code' and the Second Restatement of Con-
flicts of Laws recognize party autonomy.1
A difficult problem arises when the choice of law is something
other than that of the forum or that of one of the parties'
domiciles. This is especially so if the choice of law appears to be an
attempt to avoid a mandatory local rule. In England, the courts
have shield away from the dictum in Vita Foods Products, Inc. v.
Urus Shipping Co. s5 to the effect that as long as a choice of law is
legal, bona fide, and does not violate public policy, no connection
with England is necessary, and the choice will be honored.
In the United States, the Uniform Commercial Code requires a
reasonable relationship between the chosen law and the business
transaction.88 Although the Restatement of Conflicts of Laws
makes a distinction between those areas in which the parties are
free to choose the applicable law and those areas in which they
are not, the choice nevertheless will be given effect if a reasonable
basis is found and there is no violation of public policy. s7 The
Restatement's position indicates that contract law, unlike the law
The parties agree that if any controversy or claim shall arise out of this agree-
ment or the breach thereof and either party shall request that the matter shall be
settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules then obtaining of the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce, Paris, France, by a single arbitrator, if the parties
shall agree upon one, or by arbitrator appointed by each party and a third ar-
bitrator appointed by the other arbitrators. In case of any failure of a party to
make an appointment referred to above within four weeks after notice of the con-
troversy, such appointement shall be made by said chamber. All arbitration pro-
ceedings shall be held in Paris, France, and each party agreed to comply in all
respects with any award made in any such proceeding and to the entry of a judge-
ment if any jurisdiction upon any award rendered in such proceeding. The laws of
the State of Illinois, U.S.A. shall apply to and govern this agreement, its inter-
pretation and preformance.
Id. at 509 n. 1.
82 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 732.
.3 U.C.C. § 1-105.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
'5 Vita Foods Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., (1939) A.C. 277.
" U.C.C. § 1-105.
'7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971). Some of the areas in which
the parties are not free to choose the law are substantial illegality, formalities and capacity.
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of the proceedings, is really supplemental. Contract law generally
aims to give effect to, and is subordinate to the terms of the
agreement.
In practice, the "reasonable connection" requirement is not a
problem in contracts between developed and developing states
because the choice of law is usually that of one of the parties.
Generally, the courts will accept anything that is commercially
reasonable. The arbitrator, whose position is itself the result of a
private agreement, is not bound to effectuate a nation's interests,
and typically is more inclined than the courts to uphold choice of
law clauses. However, there is a problem when the courts must
determine the law to be applied to the merits if there are no
stipulations regarding this law in the contract. The English courts
attempt to determine the "system of law with which the transac-
tion has its closest and most real connection."88
Some contracts between developing and developed states in-
clude choice of the clauses that stipulate that arbitration is to be
performed "under the English Arbitration Act," or "under the ar-
bitration laws of New York." This type of clause is generally con-
sidered to be a choice of procedural law. If the contract also in-
cludes a choice of the site of arbitration, a choice of procedure
would be redundant, indicating that the clause is actually a choice
of substantive law. If the clause appears by itself, a choice of seat
and a selection of the substantive law is intended.89 Considering
the uncertainty involved with the use of these clauses, it is best
not to use them at all.
Notwithstanding an explicit choice of law by the parties, the
law of the proceedings will determine the substantive law. The
choice of law clause will result in the use of local substantive law
of the legal system specified as long as the conflict rules of the
forum so allow. Of course, the developing countries favor limits on
party autonomy and insist that local law be applied to the dispute.
. VI. CONCLUSION
The prospects for cooperation between the developed and
developing countries in the settlement of investment disputes by
arbitration are less than promising. The developing countries are
moving toward planned economies with an express favoritism for
88 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 69, at 721; Bonython v. Commonwealth of Australia, (1951)
A.C. 201 (P.C.).
89 Smedresman, supra note 57, at 298.
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national investors as a means to economic growth. Although
developing countries are seeking to industrialize their economies,
and although foreign capital and technology are necessary to
achieve this aim, foreign investment will be controlled carefully
by the developing nations. On the other hand, developed countries
prefer the status quo to the extent that in the atmosphere of in-
decision and absence of agreed upon rules they are able to exact
the best deals for themselves. Any hope for cooperation in the
establishment of a viable arbitration process as a method of
dispute settlement depends on a clear assessment by both groups
of their interests. If cooperation is to be achieved, developed coun-
tries should recognize the developing countries' attitude that
foreign investments will be accepted only if a positive contribu-
tion is made to the developing nation's economy. There must be
some minimum agreement on the substantive issues of foreign in-
vestments if an effective process of dispute settlement by arbitra-
tion is to be achieved. The mechanism for dispute settlement
should not require the parties to politicize what are essentially
business problems. The goal is the promotion of healthy
economies and world trade. Considering the obstacles to effective
international arbitration using the present conflict rules, especial-
ly from the developing countries point of view, it will be more
useful to promulgate international substantive standards and
rules on investment codes and leave dispute settlement to the na-
tional courts.
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